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DRAFT ARTICLES FOR THE EXPANSION OF
AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF
UNITED STATES TREATIES*
Perry L. Pickert**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The effectiveness of international law is limited by the absence of community institutions competent to create, interpret,
and enforce the law. The United States and other major powers
have been unwilling to create international institutions with the
legal capacity and physical power to achieve effective centralization. While the United Nations and the International Court of
Justice appear to be centralized institutions, they enjoy only
guarded allocations of legal power and are further hampered by
procedural safeguards such as jurisdictional reservations and the
power of veto. The United Nations framework merely masks the
decentralized nature of the international legal system.'
In addition to being the only source of international law,
States retain the right to interpret and enforce the law which they
create.' This problem is compounded by the fact that under general international law, an interpretation by one State is not binding upon another State without its consent. The absence of a
dominant, central institution permits States to abuse their right
of interpretation and leads to characterization of international
law as little more than political rhetoric. The obvious solution
would be the establishment of universal compulsory jurisdiction
* The author wishes to thank Professors Richard R. Baxter and Louis B. Sohn for
their helpful criticism of the initial drafts of this article.
** Ph.D candidate, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; Visiting Scholar, Faculty of Law, Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, 1972-74; Amherst-Doshisha
Fellowship, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan, 1967-68; B.A., Amherst College, 1967.
1. Gross, The Charterof the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations, 41 Am. J.
INT'L L.

531 (1947).

2. The international legal system suffers from a "complete lack of a particular organ
charged with the application of legal norms to a concrete instance." H. KELSEN, GENERAL
THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
THEORY].

338 (A. Wedberg transl. 1949) [hereinafter cited as

GENERAL

3. "The fundamental principle of the juridical equality of States is opposed to placing
one State under the jurisdiction of another State" or to "subjecti[ng] . . . one State to
an interpretation of a treaty asserted by another State." Jesse Lewis (David J. Adams)
Case (United States v. Great Britain), 4 Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 85, 89, 16 Am. J. INT'L L.
315, 318 (1922). According to Chief Justice Marshall, "no nation can prescribe a rule for
others, none can make a law of nations.
... The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122
(1825).
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of the International Court of Justice, but with the contemporary

state of international relations and of attitudes toward international institutions,4 such a proposal is unrealistic.5 However, limited expansion of the Court's jurisdiction can be accomplished.'
The United States, for example, has facilitated greater use of the
International Court by accepting its compulsory jurisdiction with
respect to some treaties. 7 Furthermore, the United States Senate,
while traditionally opposed to expanded use of the International
Court, has expressed support for the extension of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court in disputes arising from interpretation
and application of future United States treaties.
This paper discusses the problems caused by the abuse of
unilateral interpretation of international law and of treaties and
suggests draft articles for inclusion in bilateral and multilateral
treaties and in the constitutions of international organizations.
The articles provide for compulsory settlement by the International Court of disputes arising from the interpretation or application of such treaties or constitutions. Also presented is a model
bilateral treaty for submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of
4. See, e.g., Elkind, French Nuclear Testing and Article 41-Another Blow to the
Authority of the Court?, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 39 (1974); Briggs, UnilateralDenunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the InternationalCourt of Justice, 68 AM.
J. INT'L L. 51 (1974).
5. For example, the Lodge Commission found that
since 1946 the United States has committed itself, without reservations, to the
jurisdiction of the Court in over 20 multilateral treaties and 20 bilateral agreements with respect to disputes arising from those agreements. This is a commendable way for widening the Court's jurisdiction, but these agreements are
only a small portion of the more than 200 bilateral and multilateral treaties
subscribed to by the United States since 1946.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNI-

VERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 12 (1971). See Address by Secretary of State Rogers,
American Society of International Law Annual Meeting, Apr. 25, 1970, 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
941 (1970).
The number of cases brought before the Court has never been excessive, and has
occasionally dwindled to an empty docket. Jessup, The International Court of Justice
Revisited, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 299, 300 (1971). At times the Court is unable to provide an
acceptable forum. See Deutsch, The InternationalCourt of Justice, 5 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
35 (1972); Fawcett, The Function of the InternationalCourt of Justice in the World
Community, 2 GA. J. INT'L & Cosm. L. 59 (1972); Gross, The International Court of
Justice: Considerationof Requirements for EnhancingIts Role in the InternationalLegal
Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253 (1971).
6. See Deutsch, Recent Movements toward Strengthening the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 741, 744-45 (1973).
7. For a list of the treaties and agreements of the United States which contain a
provision for submitting disputes to the Court, see Hearings on S. Res. 74, 75, 76, 77, 78
Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1973).
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the Court those disputes which may arise from the interpretation
and application of treaties currently in force between the parties
to the bilateral treaty and of all future treaties unless a specific
agreement is made to the contrary.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF AUTOINTERPRETATION

Professor Leo Gross has coined the terms autointerpretation
and autoenforcement to refer to unilateral acts of States, as distinguished from authoritative interpretation and enforcement by
composite organs"' of the international legal system. Unless consent of other States is obtained, autointerpretation and autoenforcement of the law by a State lack authority within the international legal system. While a State has power to interpret international law and to act upon its own interpretation, even to the
extent of using force, such interpretations are valid merely "for
the purpose of determining its own conduct," are not binding on
other States, and are not actions of a legal organ of the international legal system." States have the right of autointerpretation
but not of authoritative interpretation. Authoritative interpretation is binding and occurs only upon consent of the parties. International courts and tribunals have consistently denied the binding force of unilateral interpretation of international law. Most
significant have been the cases in which a State has proceeded
8. Gross, States as Organs of InternationalLaw and the Problem of Autointerpretation, in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 59-88 (G.Lipsky ed. 1953).
9. Authoritative interpretation has binding force. According to Kelsen, the function

of authoritative interpretation is "to render binding one of the several meanings of a legal
norm" and, therefore, to both create and apply the law. H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 15 (1951). The Permanent Court of International Justice stated that "it

is an established principle that the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a legal
rule belongs solely to the person or body who has power to modify or suppress it." Advisory
Opinion on the Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 8 at 37. In
the case of a treaty, this body would be the composite organ composed of the parties to
the treaty. See I.

Voicu,

DE L'INTERPRETATION AUTHENTIQUE DES TRAIT9S INTERNATIONAUX

80-87 (1968).
10. Kelsen argues that
When two States conclude a treaty they function as organs of international law.
The representatives of the two contracting parties together form the composite
organ that creates the contractual norm. It is an organ of the international
community constituted by general international law. Of this composite organ,
the representatives of the contracting States are part organs. .

.

.Hence the

representative of a contracting State is primarily a (partial) organ of the international community, and only secondarily an organ of his own State.
GENERAL THEORY, supra note 2, at 354.
11. Colombian-Peruvian Asylum Case, [1950] I.C.J. 266, 274.
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unilaterally to apply or to enforce the law, utilizing coercion or
armed force as measures of self-help."2
Autointerpretation and autoenforcement are normally tolerated in advanced legal systems. However, courts of advanced
systems are competent to judge the accuracy of autointerpretation and the justification for autoenforcement upon application
of a disputant or, in the case of criminal law, upon application
by an official of the legal system. No such provision exists in the
international legal system. There is not even an obligation to
submit a dispute to a competent international organ for settlement. 3 If one State can induce another State to consent to its
autointerpretation, such interpretation becomes authoritative. If
not, the two autointerpretations remain tentative and the international legal system between the two States contains an unresolved conflict.
In classical international law, legal disputes might have been
resolved by recourse to coercion. Legal issues of great concern
might have led a State to war; a peace treaty then supplied the
element of consent which settled the major issues. Minor issues
were simply set aside, remaining unresolved but allowing other
business to be conducted as usual. From the perspective of the
legal system, a solution was possible because force and war were
lawful methods of obtaining consent. However, the Paris Peace
Pact 4 and the Charter of the United Nations have technically
12. In the NaulilaaIncident Arbitration (Portugal v. Germany), 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes
409 (1928), a party of German soldiers and civilians had crossed into neutral Portuguese
territory during World War I. Owing to a misunderstanding, the Portuguese fired upon
and killed three Germans; Germany retaliated by invading Portuguese territory and
destroying Angolan forts. The tribunal held the reprisal unlawful because Portugal had
not violated international law, Germany had failed to attempt peaceful solution, and
Germany's reprisal was out of proportion with Portugal's alleged acts. Similarly, in the
Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4, Britain contested Albania's claim that it need not
grant the right of passage to foreign warships. When British ships attempted to pass
through the Corfu Channel they were damaged by mines. Suspecting that Albania had
laid the mines, Britain sent minesweepers through the Channel and discovered newly-laid
mines. These forceful measures of self-help were rejected by the Court as a violation of
Albania's sovereignty, although the Court upheld Britain's claim of the right of foreign
warships to pass through the channel.
13. "It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent,
be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration,
or to any other kind of pacific settlement." Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern
Carelia, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5 at 27.
14. Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, done Aug. 27, 1928, 46
Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
The Paris Peace Pact, article 2, provides:
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foreclosed this classical mode of settlement by limiting the
lawful use of force. While both the Charter and the Pact contain obligations to settle disputes by pacific means, there is no
compulsory method of settlement which requires a State to consent to a procedure or to a particular interpretation of the law.
By simply filing protests and refusing to consent to a settlement
of an issue, a State may prevent the international legal system
from rendering an authoritative interpretation of a disputed
issue.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, international arbitral and judicial tribunals were proposed to curb abuse
of the rights of autointerpretation and autoenforcement. 5 While
arbitral tribunals and the Permanent Court of International Justice were eventually created, their effectiveness was diminished
by jurisdictional reservations and procedural loopholes 17 which
were "condemned as irreconcilable with a compulsory and organized system of arbitration."18
The weakness of arbitration agreements containing escape
clauses and the use of peremptory domestic jurisdiction reservations are illustrated in the Interhandel case.19 Professor Herbert
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which
may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
15. U.N. CHARTER article 2, paragraphs 3 & 4, provides:
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.
16. See C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 360 (rev.
ed. P. Corbett transl. 1968) [hereinafter cited as DE VISSCHER].
17. The provisions of the French-British Treaty of 1903 are a model of such reservations. Convention with France respecting commercial relations between France and India,
Feb. 19, 1903, 2 Nouveau recueil gnral de trait~s (Martens Nouveaux Recueil) ser. 5,
141, T.S. No. 9 (1905). After stating the principle obligation of the treaty, the explicit
condition is attached that the obligation "should not apply to disputes, even those of a
legal order . . . touching the vital interest, the independence, or the honor of the signatory states." DE VISSCHER, supra note 16, at 360.
18. DE VISSCHER, supra note 16, at 360-61.
19. In the initial phase of the Interhandelcase, Switzerland sought arbitration on the
basis of the arbitration treaty between Switzerland and the United States, Treaty with
Switzerland on Arbitration and Conciliation, Feb. 16, 1931, art. VII, 47 Stat. 1983, 1987,
T.S. No. 844. The dispute related to a wartime appropriation by the United States. The
Treaty required the formulation of a special agreement, and also contained a domestic
jurisdiction reservation.
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Briggs summarizes the American use of the domestic jurisdiction
reservation in the arbitration agreement between the United
States and Switzerland:
[The Department of State was] using the plea of domestic
jurisdiction to reject arbitration prior to a resort to conciliation,
to reject arbitration subsequent to a resort to conciliation,
and-contrary to the terms of the treaty and our agreed interpretation thereof with Switzerland-to reject any resort to con20
ciliation itself.
Because the United States contended that the Interhandel case
fell within its domestic jurisdiction, Switzerland had no recourse.
Arbitration required the formulation of a compromis. 2 Concilia-

tion required a minimum of cooperation from the United States.2
Neither was forthcoming.
The United Nations system and the International Court of
Justice suffer from the same weaknesses apparent in the
Interhandel case. Submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court has been made discretionary on the basis of the "optional" clause of the Statute of the Court.
The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice is defined in article 36 of the Statute.? The Court's jurisdiction com20. Briggs, Towards the Rule of Law?, 51 AM. J. INT'L L. 517, 528 (1957).
21. Compromis is the technical term for a special agreement concluded for a given
dispute and normally in the form of a treaty. The document usually defines the dispute,
establishes an arbitral tribunal, outlines the manner of appointing arbitrators, defines the
powers and procedures of the arbitral tribunal, sets time limits, and sometimes specifies
the particular rules of law which are to be applied by the tribunal in the case.
22. Switzerland's attempt to bring the case before the Court was rejected during
Preliminary Objections on the ground that Interhandel had failed to exhaust local United
States remedies. The Court did not find it necessary to adjudicate the United States'
invocation of the Connally Amendment. However, exhaustion of local remedies was not a
bar to referral of the dispute to arbitration on the basis of the arbitration treaty. Interhandel case (Switzerland v. United States), [1959] I.C.J. 6.
23. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 2, makes available the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court. Article 36 provides:
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer
to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations
or in treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that
they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
Court in all legal disputes concerning:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
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prises all cases which parties submit by compromis and all matters specifically provided for in the Charter or in treaties and
other conventions in force. The nature of this jurisdiction depends
upon the language of the compromis, Charter, treaty, or convention. Paragraph 2 of article 36 also allows a State to declare unilaterally in advance that it recognizes the jurisdiction of the
Court as being compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement with any other State accepting the same obligation. Under
paragraph 3, such declarations may be made for a particular time
period and may be unconditional or conditioned upon reciprocity
with other States. Therefore, the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court over a particular State in a given dispute depends upon the
specific language of the declaration made under paragraph 2 or
upon the language of a treaty binding upon that State.
Declarations of States on the basis of article 36, paragraphs
2 and 3, vary greatly. 24 The United States has given only qualified
recognition to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 25 Purd. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation.
3. The declarations referred to above may be made unconditionally or on
condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states, or for a certain
time.
4. Such declarations shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, who shall transmit copies thereof to the parties of the Statute
and to the Registrar of the Court.
5. Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent
Court of International Justice and which are still in force shall be deemed, as
between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still
have to run and in accordance with their terms.
6. In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the
matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court.
24. Haiti simply "recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court." This is
based upon the Haitian recognition of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court in the
declaration of October 4, 1921, [1973-74] I.C.J.Y.B. 59. Declarations recognizing the
Permanent Court's jurisdiction are deemed to be an acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court under article 36, paragraph 5, of the Statute, reproduced
at note 23 supra. The clearest method of accepting the jurisdiction of the Court is to
reiterate verbatim article 36, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the Statute. See, e.g., Switzerland's
declaration of acceptance, [1973-741 I.C.J.Y.B. 79.
25. International Court of Justice: United States Recognition of Compulsory Jurisdiction, Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9. The text of the
United States declaration is as follows:
the United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation,
the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereafter arising concerning

212
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suant to the Connally Amendment, 6 the United States retains
the right of autointerpretation, which allows the designation of
virtually any dispute as falling within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the
International Court. Under article 36, paragraph 6,1 the Court
has the power to settle disputes over the Court's jurisdiction.
However, on the basis of the American declaration under article
36, paragraph 2, it is the position of the United States that a
unilateral declaration that a dispute involves a matter of American domestic jurisdiction constitutes an "absolute bar" to the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. 8 The American declaration
also appears to allow the United States to unilaterally bar the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to multilateral treaties
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a
breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in
the future; or
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United
States of America; or
c. Disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the
treaty affected by the decision are also parties to the case before the Court, or
(2) the United States of America specifically agrees to jurisdiction; and
Provided further, that this declaration shall remain in force for a period of five
years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice may be given
to terminate this declaration.
61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598; 1 U.N.T.S. 9 (emphasis added).
26. The title "Connally Amendment" has often been used to refer to the first two
provisos of the United States declaration of recognition of the Court's authority, 61 Stat.
1218, T.I.A.S. No. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9. However, during Senate debate over the jurisdiction
of the International Court, Senator Connally introduced on the floor of the Senate only
the self-judging phrase of clause b: "as determined by the United States of America." 92
CONG. REC. 10694 (1946).
27. I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 6. Article 36 is reproduced at note 23 supra.
28. In the case of the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, [1959] I.C.J. 127, the United
States agreed that
determination under reservation (b) [the Connally Amendment] that a matter
is essentially domestic constitutes an absolute bar to jurisdiction irrespective of
the propriety or arbitrariness of the determination. Although the United States
has adhered to the policy of not making any arbitrary determination under
reservation (b), the pursuit of that policy does not affect the legal scope of the
reservation.
[19591 I.C.J. Pleadings at 677.

1976]

AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION

which do not contain provisions for the jurisdiction of the Court.,9
It should be noted, however, that jurisdictional reservations
are a double-edged sword. In the Aerial Incident of 27July 1955,30
a civil airplane owned by El Al strayed into Bulgarian airspace
because of inclement weather and was fired upon by Bulgarian
military aircraft. All passengers were killed, including six United
States citizens. Relying upon Bulgaria's unconditional acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, the United
States instituted proceedings before the Court demanding, inter
alia, monetary reparations of $257,875. Bulgaria filed four preliminary objections, including one based upon the Connally Amendment. The United States sought unsuccessfully to controvert Bulgaria's objections. Preservation of the Amendment being paramount, the United States finally agreed that
[u]nder the rule of reciprocity applied by the Court in the case
concerning Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Bulgaria is accorded the same rights and powers with respect to
reservation (b) as [is] the United States."
The United States dropped the claim; its own jurisdictional reservation prevented an authoritative interpretation of the legality of
the Bulgarian action.
29. The reservation would seem to require that the United States agree to be subject
to the jurisdiction of the Court in each case. By simply not exercising its right to intervene
under article 36 of the Statute of the Court, the United States could make certain that
not all of the parties to the treaty were parties to the case, thus ensuring that the United
States would not be bound by the judgment.
Professor Briggs suggests that the United States Senate, on motion of Senator Vandenberg, adopted the reservation without clarifying debate and without understanding
its meaning or implications. The language of the reservation continues to cause confusion.
Briggs, The United States and the InternationalCourt of Justice:A Re-examination, 53
Am. J. INT'L L. 301, 315 (1959). See also Sohn, Senate Resolutions Relating to the International Court of Justice, 69 Am. J. INT'L L. 92 (1975).
30. [1959] I.C.J. 127.
31. [1959] I.C.J. Pleadings at 677. In the case of Certain Norwegian Loans, [1957]
I.C.J. 9, the Court came to the same conclusion. On the basis of reciprocity, it held that
Norway was entitled to invoke France's self-judging domestic jurisdiction reservation
against France. [1957] I.C.J. at 27. Norway conceded the validity of the reservation in
order to invoke it. The Court did not
consider that it should examine whether the French reservation is consistent
with the undertaking of a legal obligation and is compatible with Article 36,
paragraph 6, of the Statute which provides: 'In the event of a dispute as to
whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be settled by the decision
of the Court.'
[1957] I.C.J. 26. Professor Gross suggests that the Court has carefully avoided a decision
on the legal effect of the self-judging domestic jurisdiction reservation. Gross, Bulgaria
Invokes the Connally Amendment, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 357 (1962).
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Self-judging reservations are inimical to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, and there is a strong current of opinion
that the United States should replace the Connally Amendment
with an unreserved declaration under article 36, paragraph 2.
But, this view has not prevailed, despite concerted bipartisan
effort.32 Nevertheless, in 1974, the United States Senate passed
five resolutions3 3 urging expanded use of the International Court
of Justice. While the Senate did not take the drastic step of repealing the Connally Amendment, it did suggest some positive
steps to expand American use of the Court and even to expand
the scope of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Of particular interest in relation to the problem of autointerpretation
was Senate Resolution 75,34 which advocated that the United
32. In 1959, Senator Humphrey, with the support of President Eisenhower, intro.
duced a resolution which would have eliminated the Connally Amendment. S. Res. 94,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The resolution was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 105 CONG. REC. S-4511 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1959), but was never reported out.
See Layton, The Dilemma of the World Court: The United States Reconsiders Compulsory Jurisdiction,12 STAN. L. REV. 323, 324 (1960); Sohn, Senate Resolutions Relating to
the International Court of Justice, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1975).
33. S. Res. 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. S-8430-32 (daily
ed. May 20, 1974).
34. S. Res. 75, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. S-8430 (daily ed. May 20, 1974).
Senate Resolution 75 provides:
Whereas the United States is committed to the universal rule of law; and
Whereas the effective rule of law requires that provision be made for an
agreed third party to settle disputes as to the interpretation of treaties and other
international agreements; and
Whereas the absence of such provisions has often resulted in prolonged and
acrimonious disputes as to the meaning of these treaties or other international
agreements or the existence of a violation of the obligations incurred under
them: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States endeavor to
include, in all future treaties and other international agreements to which the
United States shall be a party or which shall be negotiated subsequent to the
adoption of this resolution, operative clauses providing that any dispute arising
from the interpretation or application of these treaties and international agreements which is not settled by agreement between or among the States concerned
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or other
appropriate body.
Senate Resolution 74 requested that the President direct the Secretary of State to
submit to the International Court as many of the outstanding territorial disputes involving
the United States as possible for binding decision. S. Res. 74, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120
CONG. Rac. S-8430 (daily ed. May 20, 1974). S. Res. 76 advocated the use of regional
chambers of the Court. S. Res. 76, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. S-8430-31 (daily
ed. May 20, 1974). S. Res. 77 encouraged maximum use of procedures under Chapter VI
of the United Nations Charter, especially the use of the Court for legal disputes. S. Res.
77, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. S-8431 (daily ed. May 20, 1974). S. Res. 78
proposed a study of various ways to make the Court accessible to individuals, corpora-
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States endeavor to include in all future treaties and other international agreements a clause providing that any dispute as to
interpretation or application which is not settled by agreement
of the parties be subject to the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice or of another appropriate body. Since unreserved
acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court appears to
be a step that Congress is unwilling to take, it seems prudent to
move toward wider jurisdiction of the Court by employing an
accepted method of authoritative interpretation.
III.

AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS

Provisions for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court have been included in many agreements to which the
United States is a party. As early as 1930, the United States was
a party to a multilateral agreement on military obligations in
certain cases of double nationality35 which provided, with some
qualifications, for referral of disputes as to interpretation or application to the Permanent Court of International Justice. However, since the United States was not a party to the Statute of
the Court, disputes would have been referred to an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with the Hague Convention of
1907.36
The first acceptance by the United States of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court came in 1934 with membership in the International Labor Organization (hereinafter referred to as ILO). The constitution of the ILO was part of the
tions, and organizations. S. Res. 78, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. Rac. S-8431-32 (daily
ed. May 20, 1974). For a discussion of these resolutions and their history, see Comment,
International Court of Justice-Jurisdiction-Resolutionsto Expand the Jurisdictionof
the InternationalCourt of Justice and to Improve the Court's Image as a Viable Alternative to Achieve Pacific Settlement of InternationalDisputes, 61 KY. L. J. 925 (1973); Sohn,
Senate Resolutions Relating to the InternationalCourt of Justice, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 9296 (1975).
35. Protocol relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality,
done Apr. 12, 1930, art. 7, 50 Stat. 1317, 1321, T.S. No. 913, 178 L.N.T.S. 227.
36. Second Hague Peace Conference, Convention No. I, Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536, 1 Bevans 577, 2 AM.
J. INT'L L. 90 (Supp. 1908). With the advent of the United Nations, the United States
became a party to the Statute of the Court, Aug. 14, 1946, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. No.
1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9, and thus the provision of the Protocol of 1930 became fully operative.
37. International Labor Organization: Membership of the United States, June 19,
1934, 49 Stat. 2712, T.S. No. 874, IV Trenwith 5531.
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1919 Treaty of Versailles,"8 to which the United States was not a
party, but on June 18, 1934, Congress passed a joint resolution"
authorizing membership in the ILO with a proviso. Article 423 of
the ILO constitution provides:
Any question or dispute relating to the interpretation of
this Part of the present Treaty or any subsequent convention
concluded by the Members in pursuance of the provisions of
this Part of the present Treaty shall be referred for decision to
the Permanent Court of International Justice."°
While interpretation of the constitution was subject to the jurisdiction of the Court, Congress stipulated that the ILO had no
legal power to bind the United States.4'
After World War II, many agreements establishing international organizations contained provisions for jurisdiction of the
International Court for the settlement of disputes relating to the
interpretation or application of the constitutions of those organizations. The first of these was the Convention on International
Civil Aviation (hereinafter referred to as CICA).42 The CICA provided for settlement of disputes by the Court, or by arbitration
38. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, done
June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43, 112 BRIT. AND FOR. STATE PAPERS 1 (1919). See also [1919]
FOR. REL. U.S., XI Supp. Paris Peace Conf. 54.

39. J. Res. 131, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 12455 (1934). The resolution also
provided hat in accepting membership, the President assumed no obligations under the
Covenant of the League of Nations.
40. International Labor Organization Constitution, done June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712,
T.S. No. 874, IV Trenwith 5531. The United States is a party to the following ILO
conventions: Convention No. 53 concerning Minimum Requirement of Professional Capacity for Masters and Officers on Board Merchant Ships, adopted Oct. 24, 1936, 54 Stat.
1683, T.S. No. 950, 40 U.N.T.S. 153; Convention No. 55 concerning Liability of the
Shipowner in Case of Sickness, Injury, or Death of Seamen, adopted Oct. 24, 1936, 54
Stat. 1693, T.S. No. 951, 40 U.N.T.S. 169; Convention No. 58 concerning Minimum Age
for the Admission of Children to Employment at Sea, adopted Oct. 24, 1936, 54 Stat. 1705,
T.S. No. 952, 40 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention No. 74 concerning Certification of Able Seamen, adopted June 29, 1946, 5 U.S.T. 605, T.I.A.S. No. 2949, 94 U.N.T.S. 11; Convention
No. 80 concerning Partial Revision of ILO Conventions, adopted Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat.
1672, T.I.A.S. No. 1810, 15 U.N.T.S. 35.
41. J. Res. 131, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC. 12238 Z1934). The stipulation
provided that
special provision had been made in the constitution of the International Labor
Organization by which membership of the United States would not impose or
be deemed to impose any obligation or agreement upon the United States to
accept the proposals of that body as involving anything more than recommendations for its consideration.
42. International Civil Aviation Convention, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No.
1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 (effective Apr. 4, 1947).
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for those States which had not adopted the Statute of the Court.
Since the United States' had already ratified the Charter of the
United Nations and the Statute of the Court, the provisions of
article 84 of the CICA came into force, along with the convention,
in 1947.11 Article 84 provides:
If any disagreement between two or more contracting
States relating to the interpretation or application of this convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it
shall, on the application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council. No member of the Council
shall vote in the consideration by the Council of any dispute to
which it is a party. Any contracting State may, subject to Article 85, appeal from the decision of the Council to an ad hoc
arbitral tribunal agreed upon with the other parties to the dispute or to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Any
such appeal shall be notified to the Council within sixty days
of receipt of notification of the decision of the Council."
The CICA began the post-war trend toward United States acceptance of provisions for authoritative interpretation of legal norms
by the International Court of Justice.
Since the advent of the CICA, the United States has assumed obligations to submit to the Court disputes over interpretation and application of the constitutions of many international
organizations of which it is a member." A good example is the
obligation assumed under the constitution of the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization. 6 In article 17,11 States parties
43. Art. 85, 61 Stat. 1180, 1204, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
44. Art. 84, 61 Stat. 1180, 1204, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
45. See, e.g., Constitution of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization,
Oct. 16, 1945, art. XVII, 12 U.S.T. 980, 996, T.I.A.S. No. 4803; Constitution of the United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, entered into force Nov. 4,
1946, art. XIV, 61 Stat. 2495, 2503, T.I.A.S. No. 1580, 4 U.N.T.S. 275; Constitution of
the World Health Organization, opened for signature July 22, 1946, art. 75, 62 Stat. 2679,
2693, T.I.A.S. No. 1808, 14 U.N.T.S. 185; Constitution of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Oct. 19, 1953, art. 30, 6 U.S.T. 603, 611, T.I.A.S. No. 3197,
207 U.N.T.S. 189; Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done Oct. 26, 1956,
art. XVII, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 1110, T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; Constitution of the
International Rice Commission, adopted Nov. 20, 1960, art. XI, 13 U.S.T. 2403, 2409,
T.I.A.S. No. 5204, 418 U.N.T.S. 334; Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council Agreement, adopted
Jan. 20, 1961, art. XIII, 13 U.S.T. 2511, 2518, T.I.A.S. No. 5218, 418 U.N.T.S. 348. An
exception to this general pattern is the 1L0 Convention, which refers solely to interpretation. Instrument for the Amendment of the Constitution of the International Labor Organization, art. 37, 62 Stat. 3485, 3550-52, T.I.A.S. No. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35.
46. Constitution of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Oct. 16,
1945, 12 U.S.T. 980, T.I.A.S. No. 4803.
47. Art. 17, 12 U.S.T. 980, 996, T.I.A.S. No. 4803. Article 17 provides:
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are subject to the competence of the Court in disputes arising over
interpretation and application of specific provisions of the constitution of the organization. 8
Unfortunately, as with the Food and Agriculture Organization, obligations to submit disputes contain vague or ambiguous
language.4 9 The compulsory jurisdiction provision in a constitution or convention must be precise. In particular, the provision
must state unequivocally that disputes between two or more parties to the constitution are referable as a matter of last resort to
the International Court for authoritative interpretation upon petition of a party to the dispute.
The following is proposed as a draft article to be included in
1. Any question or dispute concerning the interpretation of this Constitution, if not settled by the Conference, shall be referred to the International Court
of Justice in conformity with the Statute of the Court or to such other body as
the Conference may determine.
2. Any request by the Organization to the International Court of Justice
for an advisory opinion on legal questions arising within the scope of its activities shall be in accordance with any agreement between the Organization and
the United Nations,
3. The reference of any question or dispute under this Article, or any
request for an advisory opinion, shall be subject to procedures to be prescribed
by the Conference.
48. Art. 17, 12 U.S.T. 980, 996, T.I.A.S. No. 4803.
49. In other constitutions, language is employed to provide various procedural bars
to the jurisdiction of the Court. See note 47 supra. In many agreements these provisions
are vague, permitting a claim that a particular dispute is not ripe for consideration by
the Court. Since it can be argued that negotiation can solve any international dispute,
the current use of the phrase "cannot be settled by negotiations" invites abuse; a State
might delay proceedings by arguing that diplomatic solution is still possible. Addition of
the phrase "has not been settled by diplomacy" or its equivalent can eliminate this
delaying tactic. See, e.g., treaties cited note 45 supra.
Another problem is created by the use of the phrase "unless the parties to the dispute
agree to another method of settlement," as in article 84 of the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180, 1204, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295, in which the
phrase appears at the end of the requirement to submit disputes to the Court. The
Constitution of the International Rice Commission, 13 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 5204, 418
U.N.T.S. 334, for example, begins with a non-binding referral to a committee for recommendation of a solution; if a settlement is not achieved thereby, the dispute "shall be
referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the Statute of the Court,
unless the parties to the dispute agree to another mdthod of settlement." 13 U.S.T. 2403,
2409, T.I.A.S. NO. 5204, 418 U.N.T.S. 334. Such a procedure facilitates delay. Parties may
agree to another method of settlement which is not binding and which has little chance
of success. The best way to insure that binding methods are employed is to provide for
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. The Court could determine whether or not the
dispute has been settled or has been referred to a binding mode of settlement. A mere
commitment to arbitrate, as in the Interhandel case, is quite different from a tribunal
competent to decide the case. For this reason, the language "unless the parties have
submitted the dispute to another mode of binding settlement" ought to be employed.
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the constitutions of future international organizations. The article provides for authoritative settlement of disputes between
member States in regard to the interpretation or application of
the constitution. Paragraph one requires the organization to attempt settlement by seeking an advisory opinion of the International Court. If this is unobtainable or does not resolve the dispute, paragraph two then provides for compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court over the disputant member States. This two-step approach is necessary because the Statute of the Court provides
that only States may be parties in cases before the Court."
DRAFT ARTICLE

I

1. Any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of
this Constitution, which is not settled by negotiation or by the
(Council, Assembly, Director-General, etc.), shall be referred by

the Organization to the International Court of Justice for an
advisory opinion in accordance with the Statute of the Court
unless the Member States concerned have agreed to another
mode of settlement.
2. If, as a result of this procedure, a dispute between two or
more Member States is not settled, it shall, upon the application of any Member State concerned, be referred for decision to
the International Court of Justice, unless the Member States
concerned have submitted the dispute to another mode of bind-

ing settlement.
IV.

AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF MULTILATERAL
CONVENTIONS

The multilateral conventions in force for the United States
which contain clauses providing for submission of disputes concerning interpretation to the Court are generally narrow and
technical in scope or prohibit activities which are against public
50. Article 34 of the Statute of the Court provides that only States may be parties in
cases before the Court. Under article 65 of the Statute and article 96 of the Charter, only
the General Assembly, the Security Council, and other organs of the United Nations may
request advisory opinions, upon authorization of the General Assembly. This means that
there is no direct way for a particular State to challenge an action of an international
organization unless the General Assembly or the Security Council is persuaded to request
an advisory opinion. For a comprehensive study of proposals to improve the Court, including amendment of the Statute to permit direct access to the Court for international
organizations, see Gross, The International Court of Justice: Considerationof Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the InternationalLegal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253
(1971).
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policy. In the latter category are conventions relating to slavery, 1
opium, 2 pollution,53 hijacking, and the manufacture and distribution of narcotic drugs.5 In the former category are technical
treaties which relate to road traffic,56 sanitary regulations," copyright,-8 diplomatic and consular relations,59 settlement of investment disputes," status of refugees, 1 protection of industrial property, 2 health regulations, 3 and military obligations in cases of
dual nationality. 4 The one significant exception to this narrow
and technical subject matter is the Peace Treaty with Japan of
1951,5 which provided for submission of disputes with respect to
"interpretation or execution" of the treaty. Article 33 of the Road
51. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, done Sept. 25, 1926, art.
8, 46 Stat. 2183, 2192, T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
52. Protocol for Limiting and Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the
Production of, International and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of Opium, done June 23,
1953, art. 15, 14 U.S.T. 10, 25, T.I.A.S. No. 5273, 456 U.N.T.S. 3.
53. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, opened
for signature May 12, 1954, art. 13, 12 U.S.T. 2989, 2998, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S.
3.
54. Convention of Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
done Sept. 14, 1963, art. 24, 20 U.S.T 2941, 2952, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), done Dec. 16,
1970, art. 12, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 1647, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
55. Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of
Narcotic Drugs, done July 13, 1931, art. 25, 48 Stat. 1543, 1577, T.S. No. 863, 139 L.N.T.S.
301.
56. Convention on Road Traffic, with annexes, done Sept. 19, 1949, art. 33, 3 U.S.T.
3008, 3020, T.I.A.S. No. 2487, 125 U.N.T.S. 22.
57. International Sanitary Regulations: World Health Organization, adopted May
28, 1959, art. 112, 7 U.S.T. 2255, 2294, T.I.A.S. No. 3625, 274 U.N.T.S. 30.
58. Universal Copyright Convention, done Sept. 6, 1952, art. 15, 6 U.S.T. 2731, 2743,
T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132.
59. Optional Protocol to the Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, done Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3374, T.I.A.S. No. 7502;
Optional Protocol to the Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory
Settlement of Disputes, done Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S
487.
60. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, done Mar. 18, 1965, art. 64, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 1294, T.I.A.S. No.
6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
61. Protocol relating to Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, art. 4, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
6226, T.I.A.S. No. 6577.
62. Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, done Mar. 20, 1883, as
revised July 14, 1967, art. 28, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 1665, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.
63. International Health Regulations, adopted July 25, 1969, art. 106, 21 U.S.T. 3003,
3034, T.I.A.S. No. 7026.
64. Protocol relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality,
done Apr. 12, 1930, art. 7, 50 Stat. 1317, 1321, T.S. No. 913, 178 L.N.T.S. 227.
65. Treaty of Peace with Japan, done Sept. 8, 1951, art. 22, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3188,
T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 45.
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Traffic Convention of 19496 is illustrative of these multilateral
agreements and contains a binding commitment for submission
to the Court. It provides:
Any dispute between any two or more Contracting States
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention,
which the Parties are unable to settle by negotiation or by another mode of settlement may be referred by written application
from any of the Contracting States6 7 concerned to the International Court of Justice for decision.
This language is unsatisfactory because it apparently does
not preclude a State from bringing a dispute to the International
Court while an arbitral tribunal is in the process of rendering a
decision. Such premature application to the Court should be prevented without foreclosing the possibility of later submission to
the Court if the dispute is not settled by the arbitration. While
the provisions contained in the post-World War II treaties are
generally strong, the following draft article is suggested to correct
the weaknesses which remain:
DRAFT ARTICLE

II

Any dispute arising between Contracting States concerning
the interpretation or application of this Convention which is not
settled by negotiation shall be referred to the International
Court of Justice by application of any Contracting State party
66. Convention on Road Traffic, done Sept. 19, 1949, art. 33, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 3020,
T.I.A.S. No. 2487, 125 U.N.T.S. 22.
67. Art. 33, 3 U.S.T. 3008, 3020, T.I.A.S. No. 2487, 125 U.N.T.S. 22. Other conventions with similar strongly worded provisions are the Treaty of Peace with Japan, art. 22,
3 U.S.T. 3169, 3188, T.I.A.S. No. 2490, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, and the International Sanitary
Regulations: World Health Organization Treaty, adopted May 28, 1959, art. 112, 11
U.S.T. 2553, 2592, T.I.A.S. No. 4643, 377 U.N.T.S. 380. These clauses contrast sharply
with the language in treaties concerning pre-war narcotic drugs, Convention for Limiting
the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, done July 13, 1931,
art. 25, 48 Stat. 1543, 1577, T.S. No. 863, 139 L.N.T.S. 301, or slavery, Convention to
Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, done Sept. 25, 1926, art. 8, 46 Stat. 2183, 2192,
T.S. No. 778, 60 L.N.T.S. 253, or military obligations, Protocol relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality, done Apr. 12, 1930, art. 7, 50 Stat. 1317,
1321, T.S. No. 913, which contain elaborate discretionary procedures. Other weak treaties
are limited by use of the phrase "cannot be settled by'negotiation," and by ambiguous
reference to the Statute of the Court which would only theoretically require unreserved
submission. The phrasing of these qualifications may prove significant in light of the
Court's hesitance to decide international disputes which lend themselves to settlement
by negotiation. Such reluctance has recently been demonstrated in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1974] I.C.J. 3. After providing some basic guidelines, the Court returned
the case to the parties for settlement by negotiation. But the cod war continues.
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to such dispute, unless the parties have submitted the dispute
to another mode of binding settlement.
V.

AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION OF BILATERAL TREATIES

The basic legal structure which links the United States to the
free world economy is provided by commercial treaties which
contain provisions for the submission of disputes relating to interpretation or application of these treaties to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The treaties are
broad in scope and provide for national or most-favored-nation
treatment for nationals and companies of the parties. As a practical matter, these treaties regulate most of the relations between
the States. Bilateral commercial treaties currently in force referring disputes over interpretation and application to the International Court are those with Belgium," Nationalist China, " Denmark,70 Ethiopia,7' France,72 West Germany,7 3 Greece,7 4 Iran,75
Ireland, 76 Israel, 77 Italy, 78 South Korea, 7 Luxembourg," the
Netherlands," ' Nicaragua, 2 Pakistan, 3 Togo,"' and South Viet85
nam.
68. Treaty with Belgium on Friendship, Establishment and Navigation, Feb. 21,
1961, art. 19, 14 U.S.T. 1284, 1306, T.I.A.S. No. 5432, 480 U.N.T.S. 149.
69. Treaty with Nationalist China on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov.
4, 1946, art. 28, 63 Stat. 1299, 1321, T.I.A.S. No. 1871, 25 U.N.T.S. 69.
70. Treaty with Denmark on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951,
art. 24, 12 U.S.T. 908, 935, T.I.A.S. No. 105.
71. Treaty with Ethiopia on Amity and Economic Relations, Sept. 7, 1951, art. 17, 4
U.S.T. 2134, 2147, T.I.A.S. No. 2864, 206 U.N.T.S. 41.
72. Convention with France on Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959, art. 11, 11 U.S.T. 2398,
2417, T.I.A.S. No. 4625, 401 U.N.T.S. 75.
73. Treaty with West Germany on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Oct. 29,
1954, art. 27, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1867, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, 273 U.N.T.S. 3.
74. Treaty with Greece on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3, 1951, art.
26, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1913, T.I.A.S. No. 3057, 224 U.N.T.S. 279.
75. Treaty with Iran on Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Aug. 15,
1955, art. 21, 8 U.S.T. 899, 913, T.I.A.S. No. 3853, 284 U.N.T.S. 93.
76. Treaty with Ireland on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, art.
23, 1 U.S.T. 785, 801, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 269.
77. Treaty with Israel on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, art.
24, 5 U.S.T. 550, 575, T.I.A.S. No. 2948, 219 U.N.T.S. 237.
78. Treaty with Italy on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, art. 26,
63 Stat. 2255, 2294, T.I.A.S. No. 1965, 42 U.N.T.S. 171.
79. Treaty with South Korea on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 28,
1956, art. 24, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2233, T.I.A.S. No. 3947, 302 U.N.T.S. 281.
80. Treaty with Luxembourg on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 23,
1962, art. 17, 14 U.S.T. 251, 262, T.I.A.S. No. 5306, 474 U.N.T.S. 3.
81. Treaty with the Netherlands on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Mar. 27,
1956, art. 25, 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2082, T.I.A.S. No. 3942, 285 U.N.T.S. 231.
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The most recent of these agreements is that with Togo, which
provides in article 14 that
1. Each Party shall accord sympathetic consideration to, and
shall afford adequate opportunity for consultation regarding
such representations as the other Party may make with respect
to, any matter affecting the operation of the present treaty.
2. Any dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or
application of the present treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by
diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice unless the Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific
86
means.
The International Court would probably accept an application for jurisdiction in a dispute over the interpretation of a treaty
containing the provision quoted above, but the language must be
more precise. A basic problem is the failure to include a provision
for referral upon the application of either party. Because the second paragraph is phrased in terms of "the Parties," the argument
may be made that both States must submit the case to the Court
and that a compromis is necessary. In addition, the clause "unless the Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means"
would preclude referral to the Court in the event of an agreement
to adopt a mode of settlement, even though such settlement were
not binding. If both States were parties to the Hague Convention
of 1907, 7 it could be argued by one State that it was willing to
commence settlement according to the Hague procedures. A
State could stall for many years, doggedly promoting various avenues of settlement. There must be a point at which either party
may request the jurisdiction of the Court.
82. Treaty with Nicaragua on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956,
art. 24, 9 U.S.T. 449, 466, T.I.A.S. No. 4024, 367 U.N.T.S. 3.
83. Treaty with Pakistan on Friendship and Commerce, Nov. 12, 1959, art. 23, 12
U.S.T. 110, 123, T.I.A.S. No. 4683, 404 U.N.T.S. 259.
84. Treaty with Togo on Amity and Economic Relations, Feb. 8, 1966, art. 14, 18
U.S.T. 1, 10, T.I.A.S. No. 6193, 680 U.N.T.S. 159.
85. Treaty with South Vietnam on Amity and Economic Relations, Apr. 3, 1961,
art. 14, 12 U.S.T. 1703, 1713, T.I.A.S. No. 4890, 424 U.N.T.S. 137. This agreement is listed
as "in force," but a footnote indicates that its status is "under review pending clarification
of the situation in Vietnam." TRATIES INFORCE 299 (1976).
86. Treaty with Togo on Amity and Economic Relations, Feb. 8, 1966, art. 14, 18
U.S.T. 1, 10, T.I.A.S. No. 6193, 680 U.N.T.S. 159.
87. Second Hague Peace Conference, Convention No. I, Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, signed Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536, 1 Bevans 577, 2 Am.
J. INT'L L. 90 (Supp. 1908).
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Paragraph one of article 14 of the treaty with Togo 8 did not
become an element of United States agreements until its inclusion in a 1951 treaty with Israel. 9 Before that time, standard
provisions consisted only of paragraph two." While a commitment to grant "sympathetic consideration" is an optimistic addition, it is a subjective and imprecise term which creates an opportunity for controversy. Paragraph one should be redrafted to exclude the phrase "sympathetic consideration." The requirement
for consultation should be retained, however, since it prevents a
surprise referral to the Court without opportunity for prior negotiation. Paragraph two should be adjusted to make access to authoritative interpretation a right of last resort. A draft article for
future bilateral treaties should provide the following:
DRAFT ARTICLE

III

1. The Parties shall extend to one another opportunity for consultation with respect to any matter affecting the operation of
the present treaty.

2. Any dispute between the Parties as to the interpretation or
application of the present treaty, which is not settled by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice
upon the application of either Party, unless the Parties have
submitted the dispute to another mode of binding settlement.
VI.

EXPANSION OF AUTHORITATIVE INTERPRETATION IN BILATERAL
TREATY SYSTEMS

Most States are hesitant to accept a universal mandatory
system for authoritative interpretation of treaties.' The United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for example,
are not likely to consent to submit interpretation and application
of the SALT agreements to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
International Court. This hesitance may be attacked on two levels. First, there is no utility in pressing for inclusion of provisions
88. Art. 14, 18 U.S.T. 1, 10, T.I.A.S. No. 6193, 680 U.N.T.S. 159.

89. Treaty with Israel on Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, art.
24, 5 U.S.T. 550, 575, T.I.A.S. No. 2948, 219 U.N.T.S. 237.
90. The treaties with Nationalist China, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 4, 1946, 63 Stat. 1299, T.I.A.S. No. 1871, 25 U.N.T.S. 69, Italy, Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 2, 1948, 63 Stat. 2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965, 79
U.N.T.S. 171, Ireland, Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1950, 1
U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155, 206 U.N.T.S. 269, and Ethiopia, Treaty of Amity and
Economic Relations, Sept. 7, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864, do not contain
paragraph 1.
91. See REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, U.N. Doc. A/8382 (1971).
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for authoritative interpretation in legal instruments which rely
upon autointerpretation and autoenforcement for their political
usefulness, but provision for authoritative interpretation may be
made in those treaties where there is no intervening political
element.12 Secondly, compulsory authoritative interpretation of
existing and future treaties may be established through bilateral
agreements between the United States and countries with which
it has stable relationships and long-standing economic and political ties. The following draft bilateral treaty would provide for the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. Article one includes a list
of the treaties and other international agreements to be covered.
Article two provides for settlement of disputes either by negotiation or other method of peaceful settlement or by submission to
the Court. Article three allows denunciation upon notice and provides that the Court will continue to maintain its competence
with respect to cases pending on the date of termination, thus
preventing a State from denouncing the treaty on account of a
particular case.
DRAFT BILATERAL TREATY

Article One
The Parties to the present treaty agree that its terms will
apply to the following treaties and other international agreements:
(1) The bilateral agreements listed below, as long as they remain in force:
(a)
(b)
(2) The multilateral agreements listed below, as long as they
remain in force between the Parties to the present treaty:
(a)
(b)
(3) The bilateral or multilateral treaties or other international
agreements which shall in the future come into force between
the Parties to the present treaty unless specific agreement to the
92. See Report on the GradualExtension of the CompulsoryJurisdictionof the International Court of Justice, International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-first Conference 23-64, 71-116 (1964)(Louis B. Sohn, Rapporteur). The approach suggested by the
International Law Association was to extend the jurisdiction of the Court to include all
treaties and a list of certain specialized topics of general international law. Ten topics were
to be tried for ten years and if the approach proved successful, ten more were to be added
every ten years. But the universality of this approach causes difficulties. An issue of
general international law which is uncontroversial between two States might be highly
sensitive in relations between two other States.
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contrary is made by the Parties to the present treaty regarding
a particular treaty or other international agreement.
Article Two
Any dispute which may arise between the Parties to the
present treaty concerning the interpretation or application of
the treaties or other international agreements referred to in Article One which is not settled by negotiation or other method of
peaceful settlement shall be submitted to the International
Court of Justice for decision upon the application of either of the
Parties to the present treaty, unless the Parties to the present
treaty have submitted the dispute to another mode of binding
settlement.
Article Three
This treaty may be denounced by either contracting Party
upon notice to the other contracting Party and to the Registrar
of the International Court of Justice. Upon the expiration of
three months from the giving of notice, the treaty shall cease to
be in force. However, the International Court of Justice will
maintain competence to adjudicate any dispute pending before
the Court at the moment this treaty ceases to be in force between the contracting Parties.
By limiting the scope of the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court to particular treaties and by selecting bilateral treaty partners with whom stable and friendly relations have existed for
some period of time, the United States may greatly expand the
jurisdiction of the Court with a minimum of risk. The draft treaty
provides for denunication because of the impermanence of international relationships. Shifts from friendship to animosity are
generally gradual, and three months should be sufficient time to
give notice.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The role of international law in the foreign relations of the
United States can be expanded while curtailing abuse of autointerpretation and autoenforcement. The attitude of the United
States Senate signals a way. American treaties should include
operative clauses providing that any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of future treaties be subject to authoritative interpretation of the International Court of Justice. The
draft articles for bilateral and multilateral treaties and for constitutions of future international organizations provide language to
accomplish this objective. The draft bilateral treaty would not
only provide for compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for future
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treaties, but would also include treaties already in force as selected by the parties. Such an approach would diminish abuse of
autointerpretation and autoenforcement and would facilitate
expanded use of the International Court.

